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I. Introduction
The existence of the global public health epidemic of tobacco
consumption is a fact nearly beyond need of citation. Tobacco
consumption kills up to half of its users, causes almost six million
deaths of current and ex-consumers each year, and is globally still
on the rise.' In the United States, tobacco consumption generates
f Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, University of Connecticut.
ft Associate Professor of Business Law and Northeast Utilities Chair in Business Ethics,
School of Business, University of Connecticut. We thank Robert Canning and Eric
Jedrychowski for their valuable research assistance.
I See WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO FACT SHEET No. 339 (May 2012),
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an estimated $96 billion of healthcare costs annually.2 Globally,
tobacco consumption creates an annual net economic loss of an
estimated $200 billion.3
Tobacco consumption is a particularly pressing concern for the
nations of the European Union ("EU"). In spite of increasingly
negative public opinion and declining consumption, tobacco use
"remains the single largest cause of preventable death and
disease." Tobacco consumption is responsible for the deaths of
650,000 citizens every year, accounting for more than fifteen
percent of all deaths in the EU.' Tobacco is also the leading
contributor to disease and other chronic health problems in the
EU, responsible for 12.3% of total years of life lost due to
premature death and disability. The direct and indirect costs of
smoking in the EU have been estimated to be as high as C97.7 to
C130.3 billion, which corresponds to 1.04% to 1.39% of the EU's
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/index.html.
2 See James T. O'Reilly, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Blessing or Curse for FDA
Professionals?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459, 459 n.] (2009) (citing Press Release,
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, President Obama Delivers Historic Victory for
America's Kids and Health over Tobacco (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press releases/post/id 1161); Ruth Ruttenberg, Jonathan
Cardi & Estye Fenton, The Taxpayers' Burden from Product-Related Harm, 21 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (2011). The authors explain:
Annual public and private health care expenditures associated with smoking
were $96 billion, with $67.9 billion or 70.7 percent paid by Medicare ($27.4
billion), Medicaid ($30.9 billion-$17.6 billion federal and $13.3 billion state),
and other federal government programs, such as through the Veterans
Administration ($9.6 billion). These estimates do not include another $5 billion
in health care expenditures solely from secondhand smoke exposure, another
$97 billion a year in lost productivity from work lives shortened by smoking-
caused deaths, an undetermined amount in lost productivity from smoking-
caused disability, or $2.6 billion in Social Security Survivors Insurance for
more than 300,000 children who lost at least one parent from a smoking-caused
death. The estimated total taxpayer burden annually was $70.7 billion in
spending, or $619 per U.S household.
Id. at 187.
3 Robin Appleberry, Breaking the Camel's Back: Bringing Women's Human
Rights to Bear on Tobacco Control, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 91 (2001).
4 Alberto Alemanno, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Towards a New EU Tobacco
Products Directive, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 197, 201 (2012).
5 Id
6 WORLD HEALTH ORG., EUROPEAN TOBACCO CONTROL REPORT 23 (2007).
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GDP.'
The EU and its member nations have responded to these costs
by engaging in a variety of regulatory initiatives designed to
discourage the consumption of tobacco products. In 1998,
European Council directive 89/552/EEC required member states to
ban all tobacco advertising and prohibit brand name sponsorship
and promotion at public events.' French law prohibits the sale and
distribution of cigarettes that are given a sweet or citrus flavor to
encourage consumption.' Other EU initiatives include controls on
smoke-free environments, reports on tobacco product ingredients,
mandatory health warnings, and product placement regulations.o
One of the most controversial, and perhaps most invasive,
regulatory initiatives is the growing movement to impose plain
packaging requirements on all cigarette packs." Plain packaging
requires the removal of all colors, brand images, trademarks, and
logos, permitting manufacturers to print the brand name of the
product only in a specific size, font, and location on the cigarette
pack.' 2 Plain packaging regulations may also impose mandatory
placements of health warnings and other product information on
7 Id. at 28. In Sweden, for example, one of the lowest per capita consumers of
smoking products, the annual costs of healthcare from smoking were estimated to exceed
its entire annual contribution of international aid or the entire functioning of its judiciary.
Id.
8 See Directive 98/43, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
1998 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of
the Member States Relating to the Advertising and Sponsorship of Tobacco Products,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 9.
9 See Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Implication of International Investment
Law for Tobacco Flavoring Regulation, 12 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 65, 69
(2011) (citing CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE [C.S.P] art. L. 3511-2); Andrew Mitchell &
Tania Voon, Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications of WTO Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J.
383, 387 (2011).
10 See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HEALTH & CONSUMERS, TOBACCO CONTROL IN
THE EU, (Eur. Comm'n Sept. 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
health/archive/ph information/documents/tobaccocontrolen.pdf.
1 See Alberto Alemanno & Enrico Bonadio, Do You Mind my Smoking? Plain
Packaging of Cigarettes Under the TRIPS Agreement, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 450, 454 (2011) (explaining there are other industries besides the tobacco
industry against plain packaging because plain packaging may not be an effective
deterrent).
12 See Becky Freeman, Simon Chapman & Matthew Rimmer, The Case for the
Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, 103 ADDICTION 580, 581 (2008).
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the pack.' 3 To prevent novelty, plain packages are constructed
with a standard texture and limited wrappers. 4 Perfuming, audio
chips, modifications to pack interiors, and the use of inserts are
also banned under plain packaging regulations." The result is a
tobacco package that is almost completely standardized, devoid of
any branding or adornment that cigarette packs typically possess. 6
In 2012, Australia became the first country to make plain
packaging legislation a reality." Australian legislation prohibits
the use of brand images, logos, symbols, colors, or other
promotional imagery on tobacco product packaging.'" All tobacco
packaging must remain a "drab dark brown colour," and
trademarks must follow a standard font and style. 9 Graphic health
warnings encompass "75% of the front and 90% of the back of
tobacco packaging."2 0 The legislation effectively debrands
cigarette products packaged in Australia.2'
Following in Australia's footsteps, plain packaging regulation
in the EU is intended to advance an important public health goal.22
Plain packaging is expected to make smoking less attractive,
thereby discouraging non-smokers. 23 This is especially important
in dissuading young people, who may be especially susceptible to
the lure of branded packaging and will subject themselves to a
13 See id
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note 11, at 450.
17 See Andrew D. Mitchell, Australia's Move to the Plain Packaging of Cigarettes
and Its WTO Compatibility, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 405, 407
(2010); Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark
Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 93,
96-98 (2012).
18 Australia's World First Plain Packaging, MCCABE CENTER FOR L. & CANCER,
http://www.mccabecentre.org/australias-world-first-plain-packaging (last visited Apr. 10,
2013).
'9 Id
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., id. (explaining the legislation "bans the use of logos, brand imagery,
[and] symbols"); see also Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note 11, at 451 (stating plain
packaging limits tobacco branding to "simple unadorned text").
22 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 197.
23 Rob Cunningham & Ken Kyle, The Case for Plain Packaging, 4 TOBACCO
CONTROL 80, 80-81 (1995).
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lifetime of tobacco consumption if they begin the habit.24  Plain
packaging can further benefit the environment by requiring the use
of biodegradable products and by regulating the use of harmful
foil wrappings, inks, and package finishes.25 The result of this
simple measure could be a dramatic decrease in cigarette
consumption in the EU, alleviating the enormous burden that
cigarette consumption places on health, the economy, and society.
The imposition of plain packaging requirements, however,
may not be without consequence. Young consumers may be more
attracted to plain packaging because it would be, in the words of
the one tobacco-supported publication, "more risky and
antiauthoritarian." 26  Opponents of plain packaging question
whether sufficient evidence exists that proves such packaging
would actually discourage consumption.27 Further, some
opponents argue that such a measure would increase smoking by
driving down costs. Tobacco companies would compete only on
price rather than by brand.28  This would increase affordability,
and therefore increase consumption amongst consumers. 2 9
These arguments merit attention-most importantly in the
context of their impact on the production and consumption of
illicit cigarettes. The sale of illicit goods is an invidious practice
that can have a startling impact on human health and global
economics.30 The global trade in counterfeits, for example, is
estimated at approximately $600 billion annually and comprises
24 See Harry Clarke & David Prentice, Will Plain Packaging Reduce Cigarette
Consumption?, 31 ECON. PAPERS 303, 303 (2012).
25 See Cunningham & Kyle, supra note 23, at 80-81.
26 Freeman et al., supra note 12, at 585 (quoting PLAIN PACKAGING AND THE
MARKETING OF CIGARETTES (J. Luik ed., Ist ed. 1998)).
27 See CHRISTOPHER SNOWDON, COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION, ANTI-SMOKING
EXTREMISM AND THE RISKS OF HYPER-REGULATION 5 (2012) ("As plain packaging has
yet to be tried anywhere in the world, there is no solid evidence of its efficacy or
unintended consequences."). Snowdon also critiques the soundness of the scientific
literature that claims to support the connection between plain packaging and
consumption. Id. at 18-22.
28 See Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note I1, at 455.
29 See id.
30 See Beverly Earle, Gerald A. Madek & Christina Madek, Combating the New
Drug Trade of Counterfeit Goods: A Proposal for New Legal Remedies, 20 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 677, 679 (2012) (stating counterfeit goods pose a public health
hazard and injure state and federal governments through lost tax revenue).
2013 1019
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five to seven percent of global trade.3 1 Counterfeit goods are
responsible for thousands of deaths,3 2 deny governments badly
needed taxation,3 3 and prevent workers in counterfeiting factories
from benefiting from the protection of labor laws.34 Such goods
also erode the profitability of legitimate industries35 and facilitate
terrorist organizations.3 6
Illicit tobacco has the potential to cause all of these harms.
One author reports that the trade in counterfeit cigarettes through a
Los Angeles, California port alone was estimated at $1 billion
annually and generated a profit margin that rivaled the sale of
narcotics." A member of the European Parliament estimates that
illicit cigarettes cost the EU budget C1 billion of uncollected tax
revenue and up to E9 billion of uncollected revenue by EU
member states.38 In parts of Spain and Ireland, illicit cigarettes
now command twenty and seventeen percent, respectively, of the
market.39 In Bulgaria, the deputy prime minister and finance
minister report that "the market share of smuggled cigarettes more
than doubled between 2008 and 2010."4 This demand may be in
part due to a weak economic climate and a desire for cheaper
alternatives, but it still remains an important indicator illustrating
the pervasiveness of the market for illicit cigarettes throughout
31 Id. at 678; About Counterfeiting, INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION,
http://www.iacc.org/about-counterfeiting/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
32 See Robert Bird, Counterfeit Drugs: A Global Consumer Perspective, 8 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 389-90 (2007).
33 See Elizabeth Ferrill, Clearing the Swamp for Intellectual Property
Harmonization: Understanding and Appreciating the Barriers to Full TRIPS
Compliance for Industrializing and Non-Industrialized Countries, 15 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 137, 145 (2007).
34 See id.
35 See Bird, supra note 32, at 387.
36 See Earle et al., supra note 30, at 679.
37 Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 203, 223 n.103 (2006).
38 Stephen Castle & Doreen Carvajal, Europe's Downturn Creates Unlikely
Smugglers, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/
europe/europes-downturn-creates-unlikely-cigarette-smugglers.html (interviewing Jens
Geier, a German member of the European Parliament).
39 Id.
40 Id.
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Europe.4 Any plain packaging regulations must take into account
the potential impact on this destructive industry.
While other law review articles have discussed the legality of
plain packaging measures under TRIPS4 2 and international
investment law,43 there has been little dedicated discussion on the
impact of plain packaging on the illicit and non-illicit cigarette
market, which is the focus of this article.44 Part II of this article
examines the international and European legislation underlying
plain packaging regulation. Part III explores the impact of plain
packaging legislation on illicit and non-illicit cigarettes in the EU.
Part III also examines what impact plain packaging legislation is
likely to have on consumer behavior, the potential role of price
changes arising from such legislation, and the reaction of illicit
smuggling to the new regulatory environment. Finally, Part III
shows that, while plain packaging will almost certainly have a
suppressive impact on cigarette consumption, regulators must be
careful to implement such legislation to avoid any unexpected
spillover effects. Part IV concludes and poses additional questions
for consideration.
II. Plain Packaging Regulation in the EU
This Part reviews the development of tobacco and plain
packaging regulation in the EU. It first describes the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC")45 administered by the
World Health Organization ("WHO"). It then focuses on the
Tobacco Products Directive ("TPD")46 and its pending and
41 The enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe may also be a factor. See
generally Graeme P. Herd & Anne Aldis, EU Enlargement and Organized Crime:
Transdniestria as a Case Study, in THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT 69 (David Brown & Alistair J. K. Shepherd eds., 2007) (explaining how
organized crime, including the sale of counterfeit cigarettes, may be hindering the
implementation of "EU enlargement policy").
42 E.g., Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note I1; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 414-21.
43 E.g., Sam Foster Halabi, International Trademark Protection and Global Public
Health: A Just-Compensation Regime for Expropriations and Regulatory Takings, 61
CATH. U. L. REv. 325, 349-51 (2012); Vadi, supra note 17, (discussing trademark
protection and the "tobacco wars" under international investment law).
44 See infra Part III.
45 World Health Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
Feb. 27, 2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter FCTC].
46 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/37, of the European Parliament and of
10212013
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controversial Revised Tobacco Products Directive ("RTPD"),47
which is in draft form as of this writing. While plain packaging is
not yet a reality across the EU, increasing regulation of tobacco
and the explicit encouragement of EU governments to enact such
legislation suggest that plain packaging will likely be a component
of future EU legislation.48
A. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
The road to plain packaging regulation in Europe and around
the world began with the FCTC.49 Adoption of the FCTC
represents a significant regulatory achievement because the FCTC
is the first public health treaty in the world."o Moreover, the FCTC
is also the first treaty specifically designed to reduce disease and
deaths related to tobacco.'
Independent of its substantive goals, the novel structure of the
FCTC also represents a remarkable accomplishment. The FCTC
represents the first time the WHO has adopted a formal
convention.5 Before this convention, the WHO had largely
relegated itself to "soft law instruments," such as
recommendations and regulations.
The FCTC does not, however, follow a traditional treaty
structure.54 The FCTC is a "framework convention" due to its
hybrid structure between a purely voluntary instrument and a full
the Council of 5 June 2001 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning the Manufacture,
Presentation and Sale of Tobacco Products, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
47 European Commission, Health and Consumers Directorate-General, Report on
the Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products
Directive, 2001/37/EC (July 2011) [hereinafter Report on the Public Consultation],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/docs/consultation-report en.pdf.
48 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 204-41 (examining incentives for EU to adopt
plain packaging regulation).
49 See FCTC, supra note 45.
50 Rangita de Silva de Alwis & Richard Daynard, Reconceptualizing Human
Rights to Challenge Tobacco, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 291, 297 n.27 (2008-2009).
51 Thuy D. Pham & Annette P. Martinez, The Polio Vaccine and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Why the Controversies, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 125, 199 (2008).
52 Vadi, supra note 17, at 100.
5 3 Id.
54 See id. at 101-02 (describing the FCTC's unique structure, specifically
regarding the fact the FCTC is "unusually specific-for a framework convention").
1022 Vol. XXXVIII
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and final convention." The FCTC is structured such that the
initial convention sets broadly stated goals and calls for
cooperation in realizing those goals. Subsequently, parties to the
convention negotiate separate protocols under the umbrella of the
broader framework.16  This "framework-convention-protocol"
method has been successful in forging international pollution
control measures that overcame resistance from powerful
interests."
The FCTC is also noteworthy for its specificity. The
instrument represents a broad scientific consensus on the harmful
effects of tobacco." Articulating more than mere aspirations of
tobacco control, the FCTC delivers an evidence-based regime that
can provide a foundation for national laws consistent with World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.59 This helps break what
is known as "regulatory chill," the hesitance by governments to
address problems of public health out of concern for instigating a
trade dispute.6 0
Adoption of the FCTC, indeed the very idea of global tobacco
regulation, did not follow a speedy path. The idea was first raised
in 1970 by an anonymous Russian researcher, who published a
technical report on smoking health and recommended an
international treaty to coordinate transnational issues related to
tobacco control.6' The idea lay dormant until pioneering work by
55 See id. at 101 n.47 ("Framework Conventions are regularly used in the
international environmental and human rights systems, establishing a discourse on a
specific issue, setting general objectives and instituting a structure for a further course of
action.").
56 See Emily Lee, The World Health Organization's Global Strategy on Diet,
Physical Activity, and Health: Turning Strategy into Action, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569,
591 (2005).
57 See id.
58 See Vadi, supra note 17, at 100-01.
59 See Roger S. Magnusson, Global Health Governance and the Challenge of
Chronic, Non-Communicable Disease, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 490, 499 (2010); see also
Kenji Shibuya et al., WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Development of
an Evidence Based Global Public Health Treaty, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 154 (2003).
60 Magnusson, supra note 59, at 499.
61 Tackling Big Tobacco: The Establishment of the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, May-Jun. 2005, at 16 [hereinafter Tackling
Tobacco]. This article includes an interview with Derek Yach, who actively participated
in FCTC negotiations and established the Tobacco Free Initiative at the WTO. Id.
2013 1023
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Allyn Taylor and Ruth Roemer advocated for an international
regulatory regime of tobacco control during the 1990s.6 2 Roemer,
a prominent professor of public health from UCLA, stated in 1993
that the WHO should make use of its unused treaty-making power
to address the public health problems related to tobacco
consumption.63 Roemer introduced to delegates at the 9th World
Conference on Tobacco and Health a resolution, which was
successfully adopted, that advocated for the creation of a tobacco
control instrument.64 The World Health Assembly ("WHA"), the
decision making body of the WHO,6 S subsequently adopted
Resolution 48.11, which requested the Director-General to
"report ... on the feasibility of developing an international
instrument ... or an international convention on tobacco
control . . . ."66
As these efforts gained momentum, they were met with some
resistance. Some WHO officials opposed the measure, doubting
in particular the feasibility of a treaty-making power that had lain
dormant for nearly fifty years.6 7 One official criticized the
proposal as "ambitious to a fault" and argued that it was
"important to be realistic."68  Some officials recommended instead
that a non-binding instrument be adopted as a resolution by the
62 See, e.g., Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global
Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257 (1996). Ruth Roemer, impressed by an earlier
work by Taylor on invigorating the WHO to promote international law to advance public
health, suggested that Taylor apply her work to the tobacco control issue. Ruth Roemer,
Allyn Taylor & Jean Lariviere, Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 936, 936-37 (2005) (referring to Allyn Lise Taylor,
Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework for Universal Access
to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1992)).
63 See Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference
of the Parties, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 121, 128 (2010) [hereinafter Halabi, The
World Health Organization].
64 See id.
65 See World Health Assembly, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/events/govemance/wha/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
66 World Health Assembly [WHA], An International Strategy for Tobacco
Control, WHA Res. 48.11 48th Ass., 12th plen. mtg., Annex 1, WHO Doc.
WHA48/VR/12 (May 12, 1995), available at http://www.who.int/tobaccol
framework/wha eb/wha48_11/en/.
67 See Roemer et al., supra note 62, at 937.
68 Id.
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WHA or a treaty adopted under the United Nations.6 9 In spite of
this resistance, the original recommendation of a binding treaty
forged through the WHO remained.0
The tobacco industry and supporting interests also resisted
negotiations.7 ' Industry representatives opposed a comprehensive
treaty, instead preferring regulation of the issue by the market and
purely voluntary initiatives.72 Their proposed alternatives, such as
production of tobacco products with fewer contaminants and
carcinogens, were believed to have little impact on youth and adult
consumption of tobacco." The industry also attempted to preempt
the negotiations with their own corporate responsibility campaign
that would eliminate the need for the new regime.74
In spite of this opposition, more than three years of
negotiations produced a final text that was unanimously adopted
by WHO member states at the 56th World Health Assembly. 5
The FCTC entered into force on February 27, 2005.76 As of 2012,
176 countries have signed the FCTC.n With the vast majority of
the world's population represented, the FCTC is poised to have
substantial and long-term influence on the global consumption of
tobacco.
The FCTC is comprised of thirty-eight articles, a number of
which are relevant to the plain packaging issue.7 ' Further, the
FCTC is supported by a number of "Guidelines for
Implementation" that build upon the broad mandates of the
69 See id.
70 See id
71 See id.
72 See id. at 938; see also Tackling Tobacco, supra note 61, at 17 ("Philip Morris,
BAT and others worked hard to see whether they could preempt the FCTC by offering
some voluntary concessions, particularly in the area of marketing.").
73 See Halabi, The World Health Organization, supra note 63, at 130-31.
74 See id at 131.
75 See An International Treaty for Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug.
12, 2003), http://www.who.int/features/2003/08/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
76 See About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/fctc/about/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
77 See Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/fctc/signatoriesparties/en/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2013). The United States has signed, but not ratified, the FCTC. See id.
7 See Halabi, The World Health Organization, supra note 63, at iv.
2013 1025
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articles.79 The legal status of these guidelines remains unclear.
While some opponents perceive the guidelines as merely "non-
binding recommendations,"" FCTC supporters call them
"principles and recommendations to assist Parties in best practice
implementation of their treaty obligations."' Regardless of the
specific language, the guidelines likely will be important metrics
in fulfilling the goals of the FCTC.
Article 5 of the FCTC presents a broad mandate for signatories
to establish a national coordinating mechanism for tobacco
control.82 This article also mandates that signatories implement
effective legal measures to prevent or reduce tobacco
consumption. Additionally, Article 5 encourages cooperation in
formulating future guidelines for implementing the FCTC;8 4 the
drafters expected that these guidelines would arise from
collaborations and would help to implement and clarify the treaty
provisions.85
Article 11 of the FCTC directly addresses the packing and
labeling of tobacco products8 6 by requiring members to implement
measures ensuring that packaging and labeling do not promote a
tobacco product through deceptive means." This includes
misleading impressions about health characteristics, hazards, or
emissions that can arise from a trademark or other descriptor that
indirectly or directly creates false impressions." Article 11 also
requires that tobacco packaging contain health warnings
describing the harmful effects of tobacco that are large, clear, and
comprise at least thirty percent of the principle display areas on
79 See id
80 Id. at 126 (quoting a 2009 annual report of Philip Morris International).
81 Id. (quoting a report from Framework Convention Alliance, a civil society
group).
82 See FCTC, supra note 45, art. 5(2)(a)-(b).
83 See id
84 See id art. 5(4).
85 See WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION, at v (2011 ed.), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
2011/9789241501316eng.pdf [hereinafter FCTC Guidelines].
86 See FCTC, supra note 45, art. 11(a).
87 See id.
88 See id.
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the package.8 9
Guidelines to Article 11 further develop these principles by
offering specific suggestions for appropriate packaging design
elements, including warning location, size, color, rotation, content,
language, source attribution, and the use of pictorials.90 These
guidelines offer remarkable detail, relying on scientific studies to
recommend the ideal presentation of packaging warnings for
maximum effect." They also address possible obstructions, such
as tax stamps and other markings, and state that such markings
should not obstruct any of the health warnings or messages.9 2 The
guidelines recommend pictorials because they are more effective
than text alone and can reach low literacy consumers in addition to
those who cannot read the language in which the warning is
written.93
Leaving little to chance, the guidelines also suggest methods
for the process of developing effective packaging and labeling
requirements.94 The Article 11 guidelines exhort signatories to be
aware of the different types of tobacco packaging and a wide
variety of potential methods for applying health warnings,
including tins, boxes, pouches, shell packages, cartons, and the
like. 95 Pre-market testing is also recommended to ensure that the
warnings are effective, and signatories are encouraged to invite
civil society organizations unaffiliated with the tobacco industry to
contribute to this process.9 6
The Article 11 guidelines discuss, in a practical manner, the
drafting and administration of legal measures associated with new
packaging rules.97 The measures include clear provisions for legal
liability as well as enforcement powers and a range of fines and
penalties that may be assessed against non-compliant tobacco
89 See id art. 1I(b).
90 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 53-57.
91 E.g., id. at 52-23 ("Research indicates that health warnings and messages are
more visible at the top rather than at the bottom of the front and back of packages.").
92 See id. at 53.
93 See id. at 54.
94 See id at 51.
95 See id at 58.
96 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 58.
97 See id. at 60.
2013 1027
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
firms.9 8 Once these measures are put in place, signatories should
assess their effectiveness and make revisions at regular intervals as
needed to ensure maximum compliance.9 9
Article 11 also encourages plain packaging, stating that:
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit
the use of logos, colours, brand images or promotional
information on packaging other than brand names and product
names displayed in a standard colour and font style (plain
packaging). This may increase the noticeability and
effectiveness of health warnings and messages, prevent the
package from detracting attention from them, and address
industry package design techniques that may suggest that some
products are less harmful than others.'00
Additionally, the guidelines note that plain packaging can
neutralize the effects of advertising and promotion generally.'o'
Packs under a plain packaging system might be limited to a few
colors, the brand name and manufacturer's name, and the quantity
of product in the package.'02 Logos, special fonts, or non-
standardized shape, size, and materials would not be permitted on
the pack.'03
Of some additional relevance is Article 13, which regulates
"tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship." 0 4 Article 13
states that each signatory "shall, in accordance with its constitution
or constitutional principles, undertake a comprehensive ban of all
tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship."' 0  Nations
restricted from doing so because of constitutional limitations shall
apply appropriate restrictions.' These restrictions shall be, at a
minimum, the prohibition of false and deceptive advertising,
imposition of warnings to accompany all advertising, restriction of
purchase incentives, a prohibition or restriction of public event
98 See id. at 62.
99 See id at 63-64.
100 See id. at 59.
101 See id at 95.
102 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 95.
103 See id
104 Id. at 91.
105 FCTC, supra note 45, art. 13(2).
106 See id
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sponsorship, and a disclosure of advertising expenditures by
tobacco firms to government authorities.o' Restrictions on
advertising, if an outright ban is not possible, should be
implemented within a period of five years.'0o
The guidelines to Article 13 are even more extensive than their
Article 11 counterpart. The Article 13 guidelines offer
comprehensive guidance and recommendations on most aspects of
an advertising ban, including retail sales and displays, internet
sales, brand extensions, and packaging.'0 9 The guidelines even
recommend prohibiting tobacco firms from promoting corporate
social responsibility initiatives because the likely effect would be
to promote tobacco use.' There is also extensive discussion on
cross-border consistency, entities responsible throughout the
marketing chain, domestic enforcement, and public education and
awareness."' The Article 13 guidelines also take care to avoid
constitutional restrictions on freedom of speech, noting that any
such ban should not prevent legitimate journalistic, social, or
political commentary." 2
Of particular interest here is Article 15, which addresses the
illicit trade in tobacco products." 3 Article 15 recognizes that the
elimination of illicit trade and the development of appropriate
legal measures are "essential components of tobacco control."" 4
This article requires signatories to adopt packaging and labeling
rules so that domestic tobacco contains the statement, "Sales only
allowed in (insert name of the country, subnational, regional or
federal unit)."' 15 Alternatively, the pack could contain other
destination-related marketing rules that enable authorities to
determine whether the product can be legally sold in that unit."6
Countries must also consider a tracking and tracing program that
107 See id. art. 15(4).
108 See id. art. 15(4)(e).
109 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 92-96.
110 See id. at 97.
I See id. at 102-08.
112 See id. at 98.
113 See FCTC, supra note 45, art. 15(1).
14 Id.
115 Id art. 15(2)(a).
116 Id
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would secure distribution and assist in investigation of the illicit
market."'
Article 15 also lists further measures to fight illicit trade."'
These measures include collecting data on legal and illicit trade,
enacting stronger penalties and remedies, destroying contraband
tobacco and equipment, monitoring tobacco storage and
distribution, and adopting measures to enable the confiscation of
proceeds."' Article 15 further requires information on reporting,
sharing across jurisdictions, and law enforcement cooperation.'2 0
The scope and structure of Article 15 speaks to its drafters
focus. First and perhaps foremost, Article 15 does not possess
accompanying guidelines for implementation.'2 ' Such guidelines,
as described earlier, provide important guidance for
implementation of the broad principles articulated in the FCTC.122
For example, the guidelines in Article 11 ("Packaging and
Labeling of Tobacco Products") explore how packaging should be
pre-marketed, targeting of subgroups with warnings, regulation of
tobacco emission yields, and a list of topics for implementing
detailed legal specifications.123  This granularity helps bring the
guidelines to fruition, minimizes ambiguity for regulators, and
deters challenges from opponents as to the appropriate scope and
meaning of FCTC language.124  The guidelines are intended to
"reflect the consolidated views of the Parties," developed through
a "wide consultative process."' 2 5 This intent gives the guidelines
real legitimacy and not merely the interpretive hopes of a select
interest group involved in the drafting.
Article 15 lacks these legitimized interpretive supports.12 6 In
fact, the lack of Article 15 guidelines reflects a thematic
preference by the drafters-that of reducing demand for tobacco
117 See id. art. 15(2)(b).
118 See id. art, 15(4).
119 See FCTC, supra note 45, art. 15(4)(a)-(e).
120 See id. art. 15 (5)-(6).
121 See id.
122 See supra notes 79-81, and accompanying text.
123 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 57-61.
124 See id at 3-12.
125 Id. at v.
126 See id. at iii.
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products rather than its supply. Part III of the FCTC, which
addresses demand reduction measures, contains nine separate
articles.127 The FCTC's supply reduction equivalent contains only
three articles in Part IV of the convention.128 Furthermore, of the
nine articles addressing demand reduction, seven are buttressed by
detailed guidelines for implementation.129  None of the three
supply-focused articles, by contrast, have implementation
guidelines.130
This is not to say, however, that supply issues must
predominate questions of tobacco demand. Decreasing tobacco
demand is the lynchpin to minimizing the pervasive global health
problems that arise from tobacco consumption in the EU.' 3' If
consumer demand for tobacco erodes due to the absence of
colorful packaging and an abundance of graphic warnings, supply
of tobacco would theoretically wither as a result, as tobacco
products would simply remain unsold.132
On the other hand, the FCTC should not neglect tobacco
supply issues. Article 15, though helpful, is not necessarily on the
cutting edge of innovation. Article 15 essentially advocates three
regulatory strategies: impede illicit supply, require statements of
origin, and encourage cooperation across jurisdictions. 33 Nations
are only required to "consider, as appropriate" the tracking and
tracing requirement.134 Other exhortations to strengthen penalties,
destroy contraband, and cooperate across borders do not
necessarily represent novel strategies that will more effectively
interdict supply.'3 5  As a result, the issue of illicit tobacco is
certainly acknowledged, but because it contains only general
exhortations, the FCTC's provisions could be substantially
improved through further development of specific controls of the
illicit tobacco supply. Fortunately, the FCTC is not a static
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at iii.
130 See id.
I31 See id.
132 See id at 15.
133 See FCTC, supra note 45, art. 15.
134 Id. at 49, art. 15(2)(b).
135 Id. art. 6-7.
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document. Article 23 establishes a Conference of the Parties
("COP"), whose purpose is to periodically review the FCTC and
adopt protocols, annexes, or amendments to the FCTC as
necessary to improve its implementation.'36 The COP also
engages in information sharing, research and data collection,
promotion and evaluation of policies, evaluation of reports, and
cooperation with the U.N. and other organizations.' 37
Through the COP forum, national representatives have been
crafting a Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
("Illicit Tobacco Protocol"). 3 8 The need arose from earlier COP
sessions, where attendees concluded that a protocol was necessary
to build upon and complement Article 15 of the FCTC.'39 After
much negotiation,'40 delegates of over 140 parties adopted the
Illicit Tobacco Protocol as a new international treaty in November
of 2012.14' The Illicit Tobacco Protocol will now be open to
signature for parties for one year and then be subjected to national
ratification, entering into force ninety days after forty
ratifications.142
Unlike the FCTC, the Illicit Tobacco Protocol examines the
illicit trade issue in significant depth. Illicit trade is defined
broadly to include not just illicit tobacco but any practice or
conduct related to the sale or purchase of tobacco products,
136 Id. art. 23(5).
'37 Id.
138 See Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, Fifth Session, Seoul, Republic of Korea, Nov. 12-17, 2012, Protocol to
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, FCTC/COP/5(1), Annex (Nov. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Illicit Tobacco Protocol].
139 See Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, Fifth Session, Seoul, Republic of Korea, Nov. 12-17, 2012, Report to the Fifth
Session of the Conference of the Parties of the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Body on a Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, FCTC/COP/5/7, at
1 (May 11, 2012).
140 For a detailed review of the development of the Draft Protocol through early
2010, see Neil Boister, Recent Progress in the Development of a Protocol on the Illicit
Trade in Tobacco Products, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 53 (2010).
141 See New International Protocol Adopted to Combat Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/
sessions/new treaty/en/index.html.
142 See id
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including any practice designed to facilitate illegal conduct.143
A main focus of the Illicit Tobacco Protocol is regulation of
the supply chain, requiring that signatories adopt effective
measures that will prevent illicit tobacco from reaching its
destination and requiring that parties cooperate in this endeavor.1'
Parties must take any necessary measures to increase effectiveness
of enforcement of their national laws.14 5 Parties must also develop
a licensing system that regulates the manufacture, import, export,
and retail sale of tobacco products.146
Parties to the Illicit Tobacco Protocol also commit to establish
a global tracking and tracing regime.147 This tracking and tracing
system must monitor all tobacco products manufactured or
imported to the signatory nation. 148  Signatories shall require
unique, secure and non-removable identification markings to be
placed on all packages and unit packets.149 These markings must
convey a variety of readily accessible information such as the date
and location of manufacture, payment records, product
description, and intended market for retail sale.' The Illicit
Tobacco Protocol expressly contemplates internet sales to be
governed by the same rules as brick and mortar transactions.' 5'
The Illicit Tobacco Protocol also emphasizes international
collaboration through information sharing, scientific and technical
assistance, and direct cooperation of law enforcement.152 Though
the Illicit Tobacco Protocol is not free from criticism, 1 the result
of the negotiations is a well-developed protocol for increasing
enforcement, enhancing cooperation, and facilitating technical
143 See Illicit Tobacco Protocol, supra note 138, art. 1(6).
144 See id. art. 4(1)(a).
145 See id. art. 4(1)(b).
146 See id. art. 6.
147 See id. art. 8(1)-(2).
148 See id. art. 8(2).
149 See Illicit Tobacco Protocol, supra note 138, art. 8(3).
150 See id. art. 8(4.1).
151 See id art. 11.
152 See id. arts. 20-24, 27-29.
153 E.g., TRANSCRIME, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL TO ELIMINATE ILLICIT
TRADE IN TOBACCO PRODUCTS 5-6 (2012), available at http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/
tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Transcrime-Analysis of the Draft
Protocol to eliminateITTP.pdf (summarizing key criticisms of the draft language).
2013 1033
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
measures that will impede the trafficking of illicit tobacco
products.
B. The EU Tobacco Products Directive and its Emerging
Revision
The primary tool developed by the EU to regulate tobacco
products has been the Tobacco Products Directive ("TPD").15 4
Issued in 2001, the TPD introduced broad regulatory measures
designed to clarify and amplify relevant product warnings."' The
TPD established maximum tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide
yields for cigarettes.156 The TPD also increased the minimum size
for health warnings and imposed rules for using color photos
depicting the health consequences of smoking.'5 1 Manufacturers
can no longer use terms or symbols that imply that a particular
tobacco product is less harmful than others.15 1
As years passed, questions were raised regarding the TPD's
effectiveness in fully achieving its original objectives to maintain
both a smoothly functioning internal market for tobacco while
ensuring strong protection of public health.159 This prompted the
development of a revised TPD ("RTPD") by the European
Commission, which would better facilitate these goals and update
regulation according to the recent science and public policy
developments. 60 The RTPD was published in proposal form in
December 2012.16 It now is under discussion in the European
154 Directive 2001/37, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June
2001 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of
the Member States Concerning the Manufacture, Presentation and Sale of Tobacco
Products, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26 [hereinafter Tobacco Products Directive].
155 See id.
156 See id. art. 3(1).
157 See id art. 5(2)-(3).
158 See id. art. 7. There is evidence that even after ten years of public health
warnings, a substantial number of consumers still believe that certain cigarettes are less
harmful and less addictive than others due to tar or nicotine yields, taste, and terms on
packs such as "smooth" or "ultra." See Abraham Brown et al., Do Smokers in Europe
Think That All Cigarettes are Equally Harmful?, 22 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 35, 35 (2012).
159 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 203 (citing Tobacco Products Directive, supra
note 154, at Recitals).
160 See id.
161 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
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Parliament and in the Council of Ministers. The proposed
directive is expected to be adopted in 2014, potentially becoming
effective in 2015 or 2016.162
The product of extensive negotiations and public
consultations,16 3  the RTPD retains the TPD's overall goal of
improving the function of the EU's internal market.'"4 For
member states that have already harmonized tobacco regulatory
regimes, the RTPD is intended to update national legislations so
that they conform to the latest market, scientific, and international
tobacco developments. 165 For example, a successfully
implemented RTPD would enable member states to change the
location of health warnings on packages.16 6 Member states would
be able to modify the display of tar, nicotine, and carbon
monoxide levels as well.167 The RTPD also focuses on measures
not yet addressed by the TPD, such as implementation of pictorial
health warnings and the regulation of ingredients, regulations of
which differ across member states. 168 Additionally, the RTPD is
designed to strengthen anti-circumvention efforts to reduce the
introduction of non-compliant products on the EU market.'16
Drafters of the RTPD are also mindful that a successful directive
should be harmonized with the FCTC and be consistent with non-
binding FCTC commitments.170
The RTPD substantially extends the scope and depth of its
2001 predecessor. Non-tobacco products that contain nicotine and
the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member
States Concerning the Manufacture, Presentation and Sale of Tobacco and Related
Products, COM (2012) 788 final (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Revised Tobacco Products
Directive].
162 See Press Release, European Commission, Tobacco Products: Towards Bigger
Health Warnings and Ban of Strong Flavourings (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-1391 en.htm.
163 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 3-4.
164 See id. at 2.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 2 n.4.
167 See id.
168 See id at 2 n.5.
169 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 2.
170 See id.
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herbal products for smoking are now covered.' The regulatory
focus is on products particularly attractive to young people rather
than cigars, cigarillos, and pipe tobacco, which are mainly used by
older consumers.'72 If manufacturers plan to introduce novel
tobacco products into the market that are outside the scope of the
RTPD, manufacturers and importers must notify governments six
months in advance of any introduction of the novel product into
the market.'7 3 Such notifications must include studies on toxicity
and addictiveness, as well as market research on consumer
preferences, including those of young people.'74 They also must
include a product risk/benefit analysis and explain the expected
effects on the cessation and initiation of tobacco consumption."7
The RTPD also applies to ingredients and additives. The
RTPD prohibits the inclusion of vitamins or any other additive that
gives the impression that a tobacco product delivers a health
benefit or reduces the health hazards of consumption.176 Caffeine,
taurine, and other compounds that are associated with energy and
vitality are also prohibited."' Additionally, covered tobacco
products cannot have colored emissions or use any flavorings or
other features that modify the tobacco flavor or smoke intensity.'78
In order to deter illicit trade,179 the RTPD introduces
traceability and security features. All tobacco products must be
marked with a unique identifier, which should be able to reveal a
wealth of information about the products origins and intended
market for the product.'s In addition to this identifier, all packets
must display a visible and tamper proof security feature that
cannot be removed and is not obstructed by tax stamps or other
features."' The drafters concluded that their preferred policy
171 See id art. 18-19.
172 See id. at 6.
173 See id art. 17.
174 See id
175 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, art. 17.
176 See id. art. 6(4)(a).
177 See id art. 6(4)(b).
178 See id. art. 6(4)(c)-6(5); see generally Voon & Mitchell, supra note 9
(discussing implications of flavoring regulation on international investment law).
179 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 4-5.
180 See id. art. 14.
181 See id
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options expressed in the document "do not ... lead to increased
illicit trade." 82
The RTPD also substantially focuses on packaging and
labeling requirements. Each unit packet will have health warnings
that shall be irremovably printed and in no way obscured by any
product feature.'"' Each unit packet will display the following
warnings: "Smoking kills - quit now" and "[tiobacco smoke
contains over 70 substances known to cause cancer."' 8 4  The
warnings have minimum size requirements and must cover half of
the surface upon which they are printed.'
The packets must also contain a combined disclosure
containing a text warning, a color photo, and smoking cessation
information.'16 The warning should cover seventy-five percent of
the surface of the packet and show the combined warning on both
sides of the packet and any outside packaging.'8 7 This combined
disclosure also has minimum size requirements and is subject to
detailed format, layout, and design requirements.'
The RTPD closely regulates product description. Packaging
cannot contain any feature that creates a misleading impression
about its health effects or emissions.' 89 Packaging also cannot
resemble a food product, suggest that certain products are less
harmful than others, imply natural, healing, or other positive
health effects, or refer to taste and flavoring of the product. 90 The
result is a uniform tobacco package design that is tightly regulated,
predominated by health warnings, and devoid of product
differentiating characteristics such as color, names, symbols or
trademarks.' 9 '
182 See id. at 5 n.15.
183 See id. art. 7.
184 See id. art. 8(1)-(2).
185 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, art. 8(3).
186 See id. art. 9(l).
187 See id.
188 See id. art. 9(1)(f. The RTPD has separate labeling requirements for smokeless
and non-cigarette tobacco products. See id. art. 10-11.
189 See id., art. 12.
190 See id art. 12(1)(b)-(d).
191 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, art. 12(2). For an
example of a cigarette package design in compliance with the RTPD, see Towards a New
Tobacco Products Directive, EUR. COMMISSION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/
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What is notable about the RTPD for purposes of this article is
that it does not entirely mandate the imposition of plain packaging
on all tobacco products.19 2  The original TPD places significant
restrictions on packaging and recommends that "[p]arties should
consider adopting plain packaging requirements" to negate the
effects of packaging advertising and promotion.19 3 The RTPD,
with perhaps slightly stronger language, explicitly permits the
introduction of plain packaging legislation as long as it is
compatible with the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union'9 4 and complies with relevant prior notification
requirements.19
According to an EU question and answer memo, "Member
States remain free to introduce plain packaging in duly justified
cases."' 96 The memo, however, does not articulate further what
must be necessary for a Member State to "justify its choice" to
tobacco/docs/com_2012_788_presentation en.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
192 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 21.
193 FCTC Guidelines, supra note 85, at 95-96.
194 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 21 (citing the
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union). For the Treaty of the Functioning of
the European Union in force as of the time of this writing, see Consolidated Version of
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/49.
195 See Revised Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 161, at 21 (citing Directive
98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 Laying Down
a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and
Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 204/37)). The RTPD states:
Member States should remain free to maintain or introduce national
legislations applying to all products alike for aspects falling outside the
scope of this Directive, provided they are compatible with the Treaty and
do not jeopardise the full application of this Directive. Accordingly,
Member States could, for instance, maintain or introduce provisions
providing standardisation of packaging of tobacco products provided that
those provisions are compatible with the Treaty, with WTO obligations and
do not affect the full application of this Directive. A prior notification is
required for technical regulations pursuant to Directive 98/34/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations and on rules on Information Society services.
Id.
196 Memorandum, European Commission, Questions and Answers: Towards a New
EU Law on Tobacco Products (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/apid/press-
release MEMO-12-1005_en.htm.
1038
IMPACT OF PLAIN PACKAGING REGULATION
implement plain packaging legislation.197 Thus, it is still left up to
each Member State as to whether plain packaging should be
imposed as a mandatory requirement. Given the conflicting
reactions from Member States on the plain packaging issue during
the consultation process,198 and in absence of a mandatory EU
wide solution, it is likely that individual EU Member States will
adopt diverse plain packaging regulations in the future. 9
Ultimately such diverse packaging requirements could have a
negative impact on the intra-Community trade of tobacco
products, and could be considered an infringement on the free
movement of goods, one of the cornerstones of EU law.2 00
Altogether, the RTPD draft proposal as it was presented in
December 2012 has provoked criticism from commentators. For
example, the Framework Convention Alliance, a civil society
group focused on helping to implement2 0' the FCTC as a basis for
tobacco control, stated that it was "very disappointing that
standardised/plain packaging for tobacco products has not been
made mandatory." 20 2 Tobacco industry representatives criticized
the draft rules as illegal, amounting to "plain packaging by the
back door." 203  The RTPD remains controversial, as its
development was subjected to intense lobbying and was associated
with the resignation of an EU Health Commissioner because one
197 Id
198 See Report on the Public Consultation, supra note 47.
199 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 200 ("[I]ntroduction of plain packaging schemes
is currently being considered by several EU member states, such as Belgium, France, and
the United Kingdom .... ). A proposal to introduce plain packaging in Lithuania failed
in the Lithuanian parliament. See Kristina Janusauskaite, Litauen - A Proposal to
Introduce Plain Packaging Requirement in the Law on Tobacco Control Fails in
Parliament, 59 GRUR INT. 908, 908 (2010).
200 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 240.
201 See Report on the Public Consultation, supra note 47.
202 EU Tobacco Products Directive Welcome, But Needs Improvement, Framework
Convention Alliance (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com
content&view=article&id=933.
203 Draft EU Rules Open Door to Plain Cigarette Packs, EURACTIV.COM (Dec. 18,
2012), http://www.euractiv.com/health/draft-eu-rules-open-door-plain-c-news-516730.
A spokesperson for Reemstma, Europe's biggest cigarette producer and a subsidiary of
Imperial Tobacco, explained that "[plain packaging] is a deep intrusion into the
intellectual property rights and trademark rights of the manufacturer. It destroys brand
values that companies have built up over time." Id.
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of the minister's associates was accused of accepting bribes from a
snus tobacco producer in return for lifting a sales ban on the
product outside Sweden.204 As the RTPD is still in draft form,
anti-smoking groups speculate that the RTPD could be further
watered down through continued intense lobbying before a final
proposal is completed.20 5 According to one author, the RTPD,
once making significant progress toward completion, is now in
danger of being disrupted by opposing interests.20 6
As of this writing, the effort to impose plain packaging
requirements does have some momentum in the EU. The RTPD
highly restricts packaging design and explicitly authorizes member
nations to impose full plain packaging legislation. 20 7 Though the
mandatory EU-wide introduction of plain packaging appears less
likely than at the beginning of the RTPD drafting process, several
European countries still favor plain packaging and are likely to
argue for its imposition at an EU-wide level; however, these
countries would likely implement plain packaging legislation at
the national level should EU-wide regulation fail.208 Thus, with a
European plain packaging regime on the horizon, the
consequences of such legislation in the EU must be explored to
avoid unwanted or costly results. The next section introduces
issues related to this important question.
III. Plain Packaging and Its Implications for Legal and Illicit
Tobacco Markets
The imposition of plain packaging legislation in the EU may
have a profound impact on the use of illicit and non-illicit
204 See id Snus is a smokeless tobacco that is placed into the user's upper lip to
obtain the buzz of nicotine. Matt Schwarzfeld, How Snus Works,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/snus.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). Consumers
swallow the byproduct rather than spit it out. Id. At least one study claims that it is less
harmful than other smokeless tobacco or cigarette products. See Jonathan Foulds et al.,
Effect of Smokeless Tobacco (Snus) on Smoking and Public Health in Sweden, 12
TOBACCO CONTROL 349 (2003).
205 See James Kanter, Europe Proposes New Tobacco Rules, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/global/eu-proposes-new-tobacco-
rules.html.
206 See Martin McKee et al., The EU Tobacco Products Directive Must Not Be
Derailed, 380 LANCET 1147 (2012).
207 See Tobacco Products Directive, supra note 154.
208 See Alemanno, supra note 4, at 200.
I
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tobacco.209 This Part explores three pressing questions related to
plain packaging requirements. First, it examines the impact of
plain packaging on consumption and perception behavior.
Second, it explores whether plain packaging has the potential to
actually increase consumption through the reduction of product
prices. Finally, this Part conducts a brief assessment of the
potential impact of smuggler responses to plain packaging
legislation through the increased distribution of cigarettes known
as "illicit whites."
A. The Impact ofPlain Packaging on Consumer Behavior
While packaging design and attractiveness is important to most
retail businesses,2 10 it is critical to the tobacco industry.
Significant restrictions in the EU on tobacco advertising are
already in place, 211 and there are no signs that future initiatives
will relax these rules. Thus, until recently, the cigarette package
was one of the last unregulated promotional opportunities for
tobacco products.2 12
The pack serves numerous important functions. First and
perhaps foremost, it is an essential communication platform from
manufacturer to consumer.2 13 The package has long been used to
209 See infra Part III.A.
210 E.g., Olga Ampuero & Natalia Vila, Consumer Perceptions of Product
Packaging, 23 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 100, 101 (2006) ("From the consumer
perspective, packaging ... plays a major role when products are purchased: packaging is
crucial, given that it is the first thing that the public sees before making the final decision
to buy."); Bo Rundh, Packaging Design: Creating a Competitive Advantage with
Product Packaging, Ill BRIT. FOOD J. 988, 988 (2009) ("Packaging and packaging
design have become an important factor in marketing diverse 'consumer goods' and have
a key role in communicating product benefits to the customer."); Robert L. Underwood,
The Communicative Power of Product Packaging: Creating Brand Identity Via Lived
and Mediated Experience, Il J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 62, 62 (2003) ("Package
imagery through design continuity and/or the social meaning attached to elements of
package design (e.g., color, shape) is a critical mechanism in the shared social
understanding of the brand . . . .").
211 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
212 See supra text accompanying note II (discussing the recent growing movement
towards cigarette package regulation); see also supra text accompanying note 17 (noting
that Australia became the first to regulate packaging in 2012).
213 See Elaine Stoll, The Family Smoking Prevention and Control Act and the First
Amendment: Why a Substantial Interest in Protecting Public Health Won't Save Some
New Restrictions on Tobacco Advertising, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 873, 895 (2010) ("A
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promote images of "luxury, freedom, glamour, status, and
[depending on the brand] masculinity or femininity." 2 14  The
cigarette pack also creates a vital link between the package and
other forms of marketing communication.2 15 Cigarette packages
will often refer to "Formula 1 racing series, concerts, and
nightclub promotions.,, 216  Tobacco manufacturers have also
produced "fun packs," limited edition packages that carry unusual
brand images and invite the consumer to keep and collect them. 2 17
The importance of pack marketing is well known to the cigarette
industry.218  A Philip Morris executive reinforced this point,
stating that "[o]ur final communication vehicle with our smoker is
the pack itself. In the absence of any other marketing messages,
our packaging ... is the sole communicator of our brand essence.
Put another way-when you don't have anything else-our
packaging is our marketing." 2 19
The cigarette is also a badge product in that it is displayed
regularly to other people in its consumption.2 0 As a result, when a
smoker displays a cigarette pack and removes a cigarette for
smoking, it is an implied testimonial to others about the user's
perception of the brand, the cigarette, and her relationship to
both.2 21 According to one Brown & Williamson employee in
1985, "a cigarette pack is one of the few things you use regularly
[tobacco] product's packaging is perhaps the most direct medium through which to speak
to its potential consumers . . . ."). The author also rightly notes that such importance also
"makes [cigarette packaging] an important and effective message space for both
manufacturers' commercial speech and the governments' health-risk warnings." Id.
214 Gerard Hastings et al., The Plain Truth about Tobacco Packaging, 17 TOBACCO
CONTROL 361, 361 (2006). For a brief historical perspective on cigarette consumption
and its link to gendered social perceptions, see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1025-28 (1995).
215 See INTERNATIONAL UNION AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS AND LUNG DISEASE,
TOBACCO PACKAGING AND LABELING: TECHNICAL GUIDE 4 (2009) [hereinafter
TECHNICAL GUIDE], available at http://www.tobaccofreeunion.org/content/en/218/.
216 Id. at 5.
217 Id at 4.
218 See id
219 Id
220 See Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence from
Tobacco Industry Documents, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i73, i73 (2002) [hereinafter
Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack].
221 See id.
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that makes a statement about you. A cigarette pack is the only
thing you take out of your pocket twenty times a day and lay out
for everyone to see." 222
In addition to marketing and promotion, packaging is a key
method for building brand equity.223 Brand equity helps firms
build loyalty and positive associations of a particular cigarette in
the mind of the consumer.224 This loyalty is powerful, as cigarette
brands command the highest product loyalty of all consumer
products, with less than ten percent of consumers changing brands
annually.225 That loyalty and positive association to the brand, in
turn, generates a willingness of smokers to accept a higher price
for an equivalent product.2 26 As a British American Tobacco
document reports, approximately one-half of smokers are "not
able to distinguish in blind (masked) tests between similar
cigarettes . . . for most smokers and the decisive group of new,
younger smokers, the consumer's choice is dictated more by
psychological, image factors than by relatively minor differences
in smoking characteristics."2 27
Plain packaging has the potential to neutralize these effects.
The removal of brand elements and brand imagery makes packs
less appealing and encourages a less favorable assessment of
people who smoke.2 28 Smokers who consume plain packs were
rated as less young, less trendy, less stylish, and less outgoing
when compared to their branded pack counterparts.229 Plain
222 TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 215, at 4.
223 See id
224 Wakefield et al., The Cigarette Pack, supra note 220, at i73.
225 See id ("Thus, once a consumer embraces a cigarette brand, it is quite unlikely
that they will change.").
226 See line Petarganev, Plain Packaging and Its Unintended Consequences, THE
SOFIA GLOBE (Nov. 28, 2012), http://sofiaglobe.com/2012/11/28/plain-packaging-and-
its-unintended-consequences/.
227 TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 215, at 4.
228 See Daniella Germain et al., Adolescents' Perceptions of Cigarette Brand
Image: Does Plain Packaging Make a Difference?, 46 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 385, 390
(2010) (finding that plain packaging impacts perceptions of cigarette taste in adolescent
consumers).
229 See M.A. Wakefield et al., How Does Increasingly Plainer Cigarette Packaging
Influence Adult Smokers' Perceptions About Brand Image? An Experimental Study, 17
TOBACCO CONTROL 416, 420 (2008) [hereinafter Wakefield et al., Perceptions About
Brand Image].
2013 1043
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
packaging may also encourage some smokers to try to quit.230
Alterations in the colors of plain cigarette packages, such as
removing the color or using less attractive colors, can also impact
the public's perception.23' While a plain brown pack may be
associated with less favorable attributes,23 2 brown may actually
promote tobacco products because of its "congruency between the
color of the pack and the color of the product inside." 233 A drab
color, such as gray, which could dominate a plain package, is
associated across cultures with illness, disagreeability, and old
age.234 Though reactions may vary across countries, the use of
gray color plain packaging could further reinforce negative
attributes due to its negative associations and disagreeable
aesthetics.2 35 Plain packaging also improves the recall of health
warnings placed on a plain package compared to a branded
pack.236 When graphic pictorial health warnings are used,
especially ones of a larger size, positive perceptions of cigarette
packs decline.237 Plain packaging will almost certainly have a
profound impact on consumer behavior.
Although plain packaging impedes the effects of branding and
improves recall of health warnings, it does not necessarily impact
the decision to purchase illegal tobacco. In a study of plain
packaging perceptions, young smokers reported that packaging
would not impact their decision to purchase illicit tobacco over its
230 See Janet Hoek et al., Effects of Dissuasive Packaging on Young Adult Smokers,
20 TOBACCO CONTROL 183, 186 (2011).
231 See Wakefield et al., Perceptions About Brand Image, supra note 229, at 417
("[S]ensory perceptions of cigarettes can be manipulated simply by changing the colour
or shade of colour on a pack[.]")
232 See id at 420.
233 Karine Gallopel-Morvan et al., Plain Packaging and Public Health: The Case of
Tobacco, 66 J. Bus. RES. 133, 134 (2013).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Marvin E. Goldberg et al., The Effect of Plain Packaging on Response
to Health Warnings, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1434, 1434 (1999); P. Beede & R. Lawson,
The Effect of Plain Packaging on the Perception of Cigarette Health Warnings, 106 PUB.
HEALTH 315, 320-21 (1992).
237 Germain et al., supra note 228, at 390. For a general understanding of how
pictorial warnings impact consumers, see Jeremy Kees et al., Understanding How
Graphic Pictorial Warnings Work on Cigarette Packaging, 29 J. PUB. POL'Y MARKETING
265 (2010).
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238legitimate counterpart. Rather, the factors that appear to
influence tobacco consumption for these respondents are
availability and price. Indeed, a number of works have
recognized the strong connection between price and the
consumption of illicit cigarette products. Some research
establishes the connection directly,24 0 while others establish an
indirect connection through associations of low income or social
strata with illicit cigarette consumption.2 4 1 If plain packaging
causes prices to fall, thereby increasing consumption of illicit and
non-illicit cigarettes, it could potentially undermine the primary
goals of plain packaging legislation. The next section examines
the potential interaction between price and plain packaging
regulation.
B. The Effect of Plain Packaging on Cigarette Prices and
Consumer Demand
The impact of plain packaging on the price of cigarettes merits
investigation. As noted earlier,2 4 2 plain packaging would deny
manufacturers an important vehicle for brand competition.24 3
238 Crawford Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers' Perceptions of Illicit Tobacco
and the Possible Impact of Plain Packaging on Purchase Behavior, 22 EUR. J. PUB.
HEALTH 251, 253 (2011) [hereinafter Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers].
239 Id.; see also Crawford Moodie et al., Adolescents' Awareness of and
Involvement with, Illicit Tobacco in the UK, 19 TOBACCO CONTROL 521, 521 (2010)
(concluding that "even in a country that is purported to have a comprehensive, well
resourced, illicit tobacco strategy, high numbers of youth are aware of and involved with
the illicit tobacco trade . . . .").
240 See, e.g., Lisa Farrell & Tim R.L. Fry, Is Illicit Tobacco Demand Sensitive to
Relative Price?, RMIT UNIVERSITY (June 23, 2011), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db name=ESAM2011&paper id=210 (considering "the
importance of relative price as a driver of consumption by illicit tobacco smokers"); Jie-
Min Lee et al., Price Sensitivity and Smoking Smuggled Cigarettes, 19 EUR. J. PUB.
HEALTH 23 (2008) (discussing the inverse relation between costs of cigarettes and rate of
consumption); Yi-Wen Tsai et al., The Behaviour of Purchasing Smuggled Cigarettes in
Taiwan, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 28, 32 (2003) (reporting that "raising cigarette taxes is
an effective strategy" to control the consumption of tobacco).
241 See, e.g., Hsin-Fan Chen et al., Who are the Potential Smokers of Smuggled
Cigarettes?, 24 ASIAN ECON. J. 221, 232 (2010) (finding that "that socio-demographic
factors do increase the inclination to smoke smuggled cigarettes . . . ."); Andrew J.
Taylor et al., Smuggled Tobacco, Deprivation, and Addiction, 15 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH
399, 402 (2005).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 213-220.
243 Id
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Competition across manufacturers would then focus more on
price, thereby triggering price wars that would result in cheaper
cigarettes for consumers.244 Lower cigarette prices, some argue,
would mean higher consumption of cigarettes by consumers.24 5
The result, according to this argument, would be that plain
packaging could actually increase consumption of the very product
that the regulation is trying to make less attractive.24 6
The price of tobacco products exerts a substantial influence
over cigarette consumption. 247  A 2003 study of Taiwanese
smokers found that a one-percent increase in cigarette prices more
than doubled the likelihood that individuals would purchase
smuggled cigarettes.248 The propensity to consume smuggled
cigarettes is also greater amongst lower-income consumers who
may be more sensitive to price changes in the cigarette market.249
Illicit manufacturers have a price advantage over their
legitimate counterparts.2 50 Manufacturers, in turn, may not have to
pay taxes imposed by governments where such facilities are
located.2 5' Illicit manufacturing facilities might not be burdened
244 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (NEW ZEALAND) LIMITED, PROPOSAL TO
INTRODUCE PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS IN NEW ZEALAND 10 (2012),
available at http://www.batnz.com/group/sites/bat_51pj9k.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO8T
X6FE/$FILE/medMD8ZBUJZ.pdf?openelement.
245 Id
246 Id
247 See, e.g., Michelle Inness et al., De-Marketing Tobacco through Price Changes
and Consumer Attempts Quit Smoking, 77 J. Bus. ETHICS 405, 405 (2007) ("Despite the
fact that tobacco is addictive, research on the effects of the price of tobacco products on
population rates of smoking has repeatedly suggested that there is an inverse relationship
between the price and consumption of cigarettes."); Joy Townsend, Price and
Consumption of Tobacco, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 132 (1996) (concluding that increases in
cigarette prices through taxation slows consumer consumption); cf Rajeev K. Goel,
Cigarette Prices and Illicit Drug Use: Is there a Connection?, 41 APP. ECON. 1071
(2009) (discussing the relation between cigarette prices, consumer income, and illicit
drug use).
248 Tsai et al., supra note 240, at 32.
249 See Lee et al., supra note 240, at 26.
250 See, e.g., Farrell & Fry, supra note 240, at 2 ("[T]he Auditor General reported
end users could purchase I OOg of chop-chop for roughly AU$13 (US$10.92), compared
to AU$36 r.r.p. (US$30.24) for an equivalent quantity of legal tobacco. This is a price
ratio of illicit to licit tobacco of about 1:3.").
251 See id ("[I]llicit tobacco is ... distributed and sold outside the government's
regulation channels and taxation system.").
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with substantial workplace safety, benefit payments, or minimum
wage issues.252 Outside the reach of most regulators or lawsuits,
they also need not unduly concern themselves with quality or
product safety.253 Once the product leaves the factory, they further
gain from avoiding the payment of required taxes and duties as the
cigarettes cross national borders.25 4 Such smuggling is particularly
fruitful in the EU where nations are in close proximity to one
another and have largely open borders with widely varying levels
of cigarette taxes.255 Balanced against these benefits are the risks
of prosecution, product seizure, and the costs of bribery necessary
to get the product to market,256  but these costs are likely
insufficient to negate the benefits of operating outside of a
legitimate market.
The prices of non-illicit and illicit cigarettes would both likely
respond to the passage of plain packaging regulation.25 7 If the
price of legal cigarettes falls because of increased price
competition due to debranding, this would drive down the price of
illicit products, which need to undercut their legal rivals. 258 This
does not mean, however, that an illicit seller will sell products at
an optimally competitive price for the consumer. Although illegal
market competition can certainly occur, it is uncertain that a robust
and fully competitive market would drive down illegal cigarette
252 Cf Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252 (discussing the
"extremely low manufacturing cost" of illicit tobacco).
253 See Farrell & Fry, supra note 240, at 3 ("Often, in order to increase the weight
for sale, illicit tobacco is mixed with other substances (for instance, twigs or grass
clippings). Microbiological and bacterial tests of samples show [illicit tobacco] often
contain[] numerous fungal spores and moulds.").
254 See Contraband, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L, http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco
regulation/illicit trade/pages/contraband.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
255 See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Europeans Suing Big Tobacco in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2000, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/07/us/europeans-
suing-big-tobacco-in-us.html.
256 See generally LUK JOOSSENS, SMUGGLING THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND PLAIN
PACKS 3 (Cancer Research UK, 2012), available at http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/
prod consump/groups/cr common/@nre/@pol/documents/generalcontent/smuggling fu
llreport.pdf (recognizing a "risk of confiscation").
257 See Harry Clarke & David Prentice, Will Plain Packaging Reduce Cigarette
Consumption? 2 (School of Economics, La Trobe University, Working Paper No.
2012.03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042296.
258 Id at 7-9.
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prices to an optimally competitive level.2 59 Illicit sellers will
market their products at the highest price the market will bear,
which at its theoretical highest would be just below the legitimate
competitor price.
If an illicit manufacturer's price for cigarettes is substantially
lower than just below market price, it may reflect transactional and
perceptual impediments that a manufacturer has to overcome in
order to attract a consumer purchase. Consumers likely know that
illicit cigarettes are of a lower quality.26 0 Illicit buyers may also
know that illicit cigarettes pose health risks over and above
legitimate equivalents.2 6' Consumers may also have a fear of or
resistance to breaking the law, or a fear of being perceived as a
lawbreaker by family and friends, through the purchase of illegal
products.26 2 Illicit cigarettes might be harder or less convenient to
obtain, imposing search costs to purchase the product. 263  To the
extent that such impediments exist, the illicit product market may
deter purchases until a lower price outweighs these concerns for
the consumer.
Whatever the differential might be, consumers are unlikely to
articulate it with such multifactor precision, but it still can be a
driver of the purchasing decision nonetheless. For example, a
prospective illicit cigarette consumer faced with the choice of a
$7.00 legitimate pack and a $6.90 illicit equivalent may still buy
the legitimate product. The consumer might explain that buying
the illegal cigarette is simply not "worth it." However, an illicit
pack priced at $6.00 just might be "worth it" to the consumer to
burden herself with the additional costs in order to obtain the
259 See Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252.
260 E.g., id. (noting that respondents complained that counterfeit tobacco "was
considered poor quality"). As one respondent remarked, "You get some fags, they'll say
20 Regal, but they don't taste like 20 Regal." Id. Another respondent concluded that
"[c]ounterfeit are always worse I think." Id.
261 Id. ("[S]everal males also reported becoming ill after smoking counterfeit
cigarettes, with mention of colds, chest infections, and sore throats."). As one
respondent claimed, "You get a cold or you get ill after smoking four or five [counterfeit
cigarettes]." Id. Another respondent noted that "[a]s soon as you take the first draw of
[the counterfeit cigarette] you can tell it's really bad." Id.
262 But see Freeman et al., supra note 12, at 585 (noting tobacco industry argument
that plain packaging would increase youth smoking because it makes the practice "more
risky and antiauthoritarian").
263 See Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252.
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lower price. As one young respondent noted in a plain packaging
study, "[y]ou hear somebody in the football team or somebody at
work can get them for £4 a packet or £3, I think it's common."264
Another respondent explained that "[tihe only way I would, like
buy counterfeit stuff or like, is just if it's offered to me, you know
what I mean, someone's got it and it's a wee bit cheaper and saves
me going to the shop."2 65  These illicit smokers, however
imprecisely, are reporting the differentials that must be overcome
before they are willing to purchase an illicit cigarette. The first
respondent presents a price difference that is sufficient to generate
an illicit sale, while the second respondent describes the level of
convenience necessary for him to make an illicit purchase. These
factors may explain why the cost differential between legal and
illicit packs can be substantial.
The differential effect does not disappear under a plain
packaging environment. If plain packaging does in fact drive legal
cigarette prices down, it would also drive down the price of illicit
rivals.26 6 A market with lower prices may make cigarettes more
attractive to consumers as cigarettes will have a lower cost overall.
The position of illicit cigarettes relative to their legitimate
counterparts, however, would not materially change, and the same
conditions with regard to purchasing behavior would remain.
Impediments to purchase, to the extent that they exist in the
consumer's mind, would not change in the new, lower-price
market.2 67
At some theoretical point, however, there may be a price
where illicit cigarette manufacturers would no longer choose to
compete with their legitimate counterparts. However, that price
point might be so low that it is unlikely that plain packaging
regulation, or any other initiative for that matter, would drive
cigarette prices to that rock bottom level. If, as some reports
indicate, illicit manufacturers can profitably sell illegal cigarettes
to smugglers at a price of $0.20 per pack,26 8 there is little
264 Id
265 Id
266 See id
267 Cf id. at 253 ("Illicit tobacco was consumed [solely] on the basis of price and
availability.").
268 E.g., Stefan Candea et al., Going Undercover: Inside Baltic Tobacco's
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possibility that such a market-exit price point would ever be
reached. Perhaps the most ideal outcome would be that the profit
margin in illicit cigarette production becomes so narrow that
manufacturers divert their efforts to more profitable illicit
activities and away from tobacco.
Ultimately, if plain packaging initiatives drive down the price
of legal and illicit tobacco and cause consumption to increase, the
EU or its member states could raise taxes on tobacco products to
counteract any impact.26 9  This response is likely easy to
implement given that the EU political environment is already
unreceptive to the tobacco industry.27 0
Such an initiative, however, is not without challenge.
Cigarette taxes in the EU are already a significant percentage of
the product's price.27' Smokers frustrated by incessant price
increases may protest further taxation.27 2 Such resistance might be
muted, however, because consumers are already accustomed to
significant tobacco regulation.
Accordingly, to the extent that plain packaging drives prices
down, such an increase would return the cigarette market to its
pre-plain packaging equilibrium. In terms of price, the result
would be an unchanged market compared to before plain
packaging regulations were enacted. 27 3  This is not inevitable, of
Smuggling Empire, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/10/20/6354/going-undercover; Te-Ping Chen, A
Massive Underground Industry Makes China the World Leader in Counterfeit
Cigarettes, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT,
https://reportingproject.net/underground/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&
id=9:chinas-marlboro-country&catid=3:stories&Itemid=22.
269 See JOOSSENS, supra note 256, at 7.
270 Cf Agence France-Presse, EU Also Studying Plain-Packaging Law for
Tobacco, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.mnn.com/health/
fitness-well-being/stories/eu-also-studying-plain-packaging-law-for-tobacco (discussing
the EU's desire to implement the plain packaging initiative in the region).
271 See, e.g., Excise Duty Tables: Part III - Manufactured Tobacco, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/resources/documents/taxation/
exciseduties/tobaccoproducts/rates/excise duties-part iii tobacco en.pdf.
272 See Adam Sage, Paris Offers a Pipe of Peace to Les Tabacs, THE LONDON
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at 21, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/
articlel970194.ece (describing French plan to temporarily freeze cigarette taxes in order
to appease angry smokers).
273 Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252 (concluding that "it
is simply not possible for plain packaging to make meaningful difference to pricing.");
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course, as it relies on a variety of factors, operating together,
resulting in an environment where illicit cigarettes do not gain an
advantage as a result of plain packaging regulation.
C. The Potential for a Consumer "Flight to Brands " Under a
Plain Packaging Regime
Plain packaging may have an unexpected effect on a certain
type of illegal cigarettes known as "illicit whites."274 An illicit
white is a cigarette pack that is designed exclusively for
smuggling.27 5 Illicit whites are legitimately manufactured in one
country and then smuggled into another for sale, typically without
payment of customs or tax duties. 2 76  The illicit white pack does
not typically attempt to confuse consumers that the cigarettes are
really a legitimate brand.27 7 Though illicit whites may imitate
characteristics of established products, the pack also typically
offers its own distinct brand.278  This pack is made solely for
transportation and sale in the illicit market.2 79
Twenty years ago, illicit whites were not especially
prominent.28 0 The primary form of illegal trade in cigarettes was
large-scale transport into one market, and then smuggled into a
second market where the demand for the cigarettes was higher and
more profitable. 281 These cigarettes were well-known brands that
somehow became "lost" during transportation because they were
see also Clarke & Prentice, supra note 24, at 315 ("Our analysis suggests that substantial
increases in unbranded or counterfeit cigarette supply are unlikely because of the less
profitable market they will face after PP [plain packaging] is introduced.").
274 See Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252.
275 ELIZABETH ALLEN, THE ILLICIT TRADE IN TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND How TO
TACKLE IT 3 (International Tax and Investment Center), available at
http://www.kangaroogroup.eu/DB beelden/booklet-illicit-trade-tobacco_products.pdf
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
276 Id. at 5, 17.
277 Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252 (finding that
"[s]mokers were easily able to identify counterfeit cigarettes, not least by the pack, and
buy it knowingly and in full expectation that it will be inferior in quality . . .
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See Luk Joossens & Martin Raw, From Cigarette Smuggling to Illicit Tobacco
Trade, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 230, 230 (2012).
281 Id.
2013 1051
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
bought and sold by unofficial traders.28 2
When large scale smuggling fragmented into smaller
operations, illicit whites began to appear. 2 83  The manufacturer
may or may not comply with local laws in the place where the
cigarettes are being produced. 284  This enables manufacturers to
purchase sophisticated equipment, operate in the open, and not
worry about confiscation or fines.285 Because these manufacturers
are not copying an established brand, they also insulate themselves
from the legal action by global cigarette companies.286 The result
is that illicit white manufacturers can produce a product at a
quality level that could be similar to or possibly even match
multinational competitors.287 Illicit whites have the potential to be
the illegal manufacturers' primary method of selling illegal
cigarettes in the coming decades.
One of the most popular illicit whites is Jin Ling.288 Jin Ling is
a truly global cigarette brand.2 89 Jin Ling is openly manufactured
in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova, has a Chinese brand name, and
has a pack design and taste similar to Camel, a popular American
cigarette.290 Jin Ling has captured twenty percent of Germany's
black market in tobacco and is rapidly becoming one of the most
seized in the EU. 291 Numerous other manufacturers exist around
the globe, and frequently target smokers in Europe.292
282 Id
283 See id. at 231.
284 Id
285 Id
286 See Joossens & Raw, supra note 280, at 231. To the extent that these firms
replicate characteristics or designs of legitimate manufacturers, as some do, they
similarly would expose these firms to trademark infringement litigation. See id
287 Id
288 Id.
289 Id
290 Id.; see also Inga Springe, Europol: Climate is Right for Increased Tobacco
Smuggling, THE CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 13, 2011, 2:00 AM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/05/13/4576/europol-climate-right-increased-
tobacco-smuggling.
291 Joossens & Raw, supra note 280, at 231; Springe, supra note 290.
292 Joossens & Raw, supra note 280, at 231-32 ("Libyan 'illicit whites' . . . are
produced in Luxembourg and Bulgaria and imported through Dubai to Togo and
Benin.").
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Illicit whites have the potential to dilute the primary goals of
plain packaging.2 93 Illicit white manufacturers do not have to fear
ready seizure by legitimate cigarette producers as they have
developed a brand all of their own.294 Already avoiding taxes and
duties in the target country through smuggling operations, Jin Ling
manufacturers could easily ignore any plain packaging rules. The
result would be that the significant advantages conveyed by
colorful and attractive cigarette packs and brands would be
concentrated in the hands of organized crime syndicates
manufacturing smuggled cigarettes.2 95
This would result in an unusual product environment for
consumers: taxed legal cigarettes, both expensive and deliberately
packaged in homely packaging with prominent labels encouraging
discontinued use, would be competing against cheaper and
untaxed illegal cigarettes emblazoned with attractive packaging,
colorful labeling, and a recognized global brand. It is far from
certain how consumers would react to such a market.
An optimistic scenario holds that consumers will recognize
that a colorful cigarette pack means an illegal cigarette pack and
therefore avoid consumption. However, this would require
consumers to look past the packaging and deliberately choose an
expensive and ugly cigarette pack over an attractive and cheaper
rival. Consumers would also be forced to ignore any of the
numerous descriptors, such as "low-tar" or "menthol," which
imply a healthier cigarette and are often banned on legal tobacco
products.29 6 If the power of brand packaging expressed in
293 See Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252 ("The tobacco
industry argues ... that [mandating plain packaging for tobacco products] could be
counterproductive by making counterfeit cigarettes simpler to produce, thereby
confusing consumers about genuine product and also reducing the price of illicit tobacco
which would, in turn, inadvertently increase consumption.").
294 Joossens & Raw, supra note 280, at 231 (noting, for instance, that Jin Ling has
developed its own brand which is produced in Russia in accordance with domestic laws
and is only seized when it enters into an illegal market such as the European Union).
295 See Made to be Smuggled: Russian Contraband Cigarettes 'Flooding' EU,
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT, https://reportingproject.net/
underground/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=3:made-to-be-
smuggled&catid=3:stories&Itemid=17 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (noting the
connection of Jin Ling manufacturing and distribution to organized crime).
296 BRUCE LEVINSON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE, CAUSES, AND IMPACTS OF
CONTRABAND CIGARETTES 45 (2011).
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marketing literature applies equally to legitimate and illegitimate
pack packaging, then consumers will have to expend significant
mental energy to overcome the very marketing that has been long
been successful in the cigarette industry.
A pessimistic scenario would be consumer flight to illicit
brands. Consumers accustomed to colorful branding might
gravitate to those brands that invoke recollections of formerly
established logos, colors, and designs. For example, Jin Ling
invokes recollection of the Camel brand,297 which can attract
consumers seeking that familiarity. Similarly, a red and white
cigarette with a particular font and size might not use the Marlboro
brand, but might invoke enough conscious or subconscious recall
to nudge wavering consumers toward a comforting branded pack.
Illicit whites would retain all the advantages of branded packaging
with none of the disadvantages of warnings or discoloration.
However, cigarette taste might impede this flight to illicit
brands. As noted earlier, illicit cigarettes lack the flavor of
legitimate ones.298 A UK study found that seventy-eight percent of
surveyed smokers reported that illicit cigarettes taste differently
than their legitimate counterparts.299 "Smokers reported that 'they
smell different, they taste different, they're too harsh, and they
don't draw easily." 30 0 If illegal cigarettes taste substantially
worse than established rivals, all but the most determined
consumers will be deterred from switching.
Taste differences, however, might not be enough to impede a
flight to illegal brands.3 0 ' Illicit whites, as mentioned earlier, are
manufactured with sophisticated methods and with little fear of
prosecution.302 This may facilitate the ability to produce cigarettes
that rival, or at least narrow the taste gap, between legitimate and
smuggled products. Illicit manufacturers will also try to mask any
taste gap by explicitly trying to match the taste of popular
297 Joossens & Raw, supra note 280, at 231.
298 See, e.g., supra note 260 and accompanying text.
299 JOOSSENS, supra note 256, at 4.
300 Id.
301 See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 240, at 26 ("[P]rice sensitive smokers with low
levels of income and education are strongly inclined to smoke smuggled cigarettes as the
price of legal cigarettes rises.").
302 See, e.g., supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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brands.303 Furthermore, plain packaging actually might make the
same cigarettes taste differently to consumers because of the box
they came in.304 In Australia, for example, where plain packaging
is now mandatory, smokers groups have reported being "inundated
with calls from angry smokers who say their cigarettes now taste
'pathetic' and 'sickening"' even though the cigarettes remain
unchanged.305 Such an effect might be welcome if plain packaging
comprised the entire market, but the aggressive presence of
smuggled cigarettes might make their branding even more
attractive on the basis of perceived taste improvement.
Cigarette safety also might impede a flight to illicit brands.
Tobacco grown with heavy use of fertilizers can absorb dangerous
contaminants into the tobacco leaves. 306 Illegal cigarettes can
contain substantially more nicotine and carbon monoxide than
their legitimate counterparts. 3 0 7  "Chop-chop" tobacco, a
homegrown and unregulated method of tobacco manufacture, can
produce allergic reactions, chronic bronchitis, asthma, lung cancer,
and Legionnaire's disease.30 s Illicit cigarettes can have levels of
metals such as cadmium, thallium, and lead in far higher levels
than the authentic brands.3 09 The sophistication of misleading
303 JOOSSENS, supra note 256, at 3.
304 Jonathan Pearlman, Australia's New Plain Packaging 'Makes Cigarettes Taste
Worse', THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
australiaandthepacific/australia/9713 249/Australias-new-plain-packaging-makes-
cigarettes-taste-worse.html.
305 Id. This effect is reinforced by scholarly research. See Germain et al., supra
note 228, at 390.
306 See W. Edryd Stephens et al., Source and Health Implications of High Toxic
Metal Concentrations in Illicit Tobacco Products, 39 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 479 (2005).
307 See id. at 480 (finding increased levels of lead and cadmium); Chen, supra note
268 (reporting that Chinese counterfeits have 80% more nicotine and 130% more carbon
monoxide than legitimate cigarettes).
308 RENEE BITTOUN, THE MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING "CHOP-CHOP"
TOBACCO 9-13 (Australian Gov't Dep't of Health and Aging, 2004), available at
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/927F4224C3D9EIA6CA
25700D0018284B/$File/chopchop.pdf. "Chop-chop" tobacco is so dangerous that it
even has the potential to harm farmers of the product through exposure to grain and plant
mold, which compromises their health. Id. at 9. This effect is known as "farmers' lung"
or "tobacco growers' lung." Id. at 13.
309 See LEVINSON, supra note 296, at 5-7; see also Debbie Andalo, Warning over
Fake Cigarettes, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/
2004/dec/15/smoking.publichealth ("Counterfeit cigarettes contain carcinogenic
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cigarette packaging makes it very difficult for ordinary consumers
to tell the difference.1 o
Indeed, safety concerns with illicit cigarettes may significantly
impede any flight to illegal products once plain packaging is
introduced. The contaminants found in illicit cigarettes are more
deadly than their legitimate counterparts and could be shocking to
the public.' Yet an increased presence of some elements not
immediately recognizable as harmful, such as cadmium and
lead,31 may not provoke much of a reaction. There may even be
a belief among some consumers that certain types of tobacco, such
as "chop-chop" tobacco described earlier, are preferred because
they are considered "natural and unadulterated." 313  However,
ingredients found in illicit cigarettes, such as toxic fungus, dead
flies, asbestos, and human excrement,3 14 might provoke even
jaded consumers to think twice about buying illicit tobacco
products. It would take little imagination to develop an attention-
getting public awareness campaign warning against inhalation of
products that may contain insect parts or human waste.
In spite of apparent awareness that smoking illicit cigarettes
imposes additional health risks,3 15 the illicit market may continue
to thrive even in the presence of an augmented cigarette safety
campaign. Visceral images may deter prospective smokers,316 but
chemicals including lead and cadmium which can be at least five times higher than levels
found in genuine products.").
310 Tim PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 22
(2005) (explaining that most consumers don't realize the cigarettes are fake until they
purchase and smoke one and notice the unusual taste).
311 See LEVINSON, supra note 296, at 63 ("Illegally manufactured cigarettes are a
greater health hazard than legal products. Thus, an increase in the size of the contraband
market would harm public health.").
312 See, e.g., id. at 12 (categorizing cadmium as a miscellaneous contaminant in
counterfeit cigarettes).
313 BITrouN, supra note 308, at 6; see also Campbell Aitken et al., Health
Perceptions of Home-Grown Tobacco (Chop-Chop) Smokers, 10 NICOTINE & TOBACCO
RES. 413, 413 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314 Rob Preece, Human Excrement, Asbestos and Dead Flies: The Ingredients
Found in Fake Cigarettes that Cost the Taxpayer Billions, MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 9, 2012)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2200633/Human-excrement-asbestos-dead-
flies-The-ingredients-fake-cigarettes-Britain.html.
315 See Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 253.
316 See Rich Thomaselli, Will Australia's Cigarette Branding Ban Spread Beyond
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might not be shocking enough to cause regular consumers to quit.
The general message of harmful illicit products may get lost
amongst numerous other public health campaigns against
legitimate cigarettes.3 17 Smokers are already accepting a
significant health risk through cigarette consumption and are
subject to the addictive powers of nicotine; 318 they may be unable
or unconvinced to change their behavior. The lower price of illicit
cigarettes may override health concerns, especially for low income
smokers.319
Overall, a health-effect campaign, powered by graphic
imagery, has substantial potential to support plain packaging goals
and stem the tide of illicit whites into the market. 320 The challenge
for such a campaign, however, will be to ensure effectiveness
amongst consumers who are most deeply wedded to consumption.
It is still possible that the consumption of illicit whites will grow
under a plain packaging regime. However, strategic use of public
communication resources should do much to mitigate any
potential increase in illicit consumption.
IV. Conclusion
Plain packaging represents one of the most controversial
approaches of prevailing tobacco regulatory initiatives.32 Plain
packaging has the power to negate the powerful effects of package
branding and deny tobacco manufacturers the ability to solicit
customers based upon the pack itself.3 2 2 The package no longer
Borders, Tobacco?, ADVERTISING AGE (Aug. 20, 2012), http://adage.com/article/
news/australia-s-cigarette-brand-ban-prompt-domino-effect/236761/ (noting that in
Australia, "[t]he packages are meant to dissuade consumers, particularly young ones,
from even making the purchase[.]").
317 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 296, at 10 ("[I]t should be noted here that even
though legitimate cigarettes contain lower levels of various substance than counterfeits,
they cannot be characterized in any manner as being 'safe.' The profound health hazards
associated with genuine-brand cigarettes is not in question.").
318 See id.
319 E.g., Taylor et al., supra note 241, at 402 ("The link between price and
consumption is clear and is consistent with the substantial body of research evidence on
legitimate tobacco."); see also Tsai et al., supra note 240, at 32; Lee et al., supra note
240, at 26.
320 See supra Part III.A.
321 See Petarganev, supra note 226.
322 See id
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becomes a promotional tool, but simply a boxed conveyor of the
product, replete with clear and unambiguous warnings about the
impact of smoking on human health.323 The EU has come close to
imposing a plain packaging regime, and it seems likely that a plain
packaging initiative will continue to be debated.324
Like any significant regulatory initiative, plain packaging risks
creating unintended consequences. Tobacco industry
representatives have argued that plain packaging would reduce the
price of tobacco, thus making it more attractive to purchase.32 5
Representatives have also argued that young smokers will find
cigarettes a more cogent expression of rebellion because of plain
packaging and that it will also contribute to the growth of the illicit
tobacco market.326
While these arguments against plain packaging come from a
source financially incentivized against further tobacco regulation,
the unintended consequences of plain packaging should not be
entirely discounted without due consideration. Notwithstanding
the aforementioned warnings, plain packaging appears to have an
overall suppressive effect on tobacco consumption.3 27 Consumers
will likely smoke less and perceive smoking as less glamorous
than under the current brand-permissive regime.328 Plain
packaging may drive prices down, but their illicit competitors may
not necessarily be more attractive as a result.3 29 Furthermore,
taxes and duties imposed by governments, if EU voters are
willing, could increase the price of less expensive cigarette
products to their pre-plain packaging levels if necessary. 3 0
Finally, the debranding that plain packaging imposes might
323 See id
324 Id.
325 Moodie et al., Young Adult Smokers, supra note 238, at 252.
326 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
327 Freeman et al., supra note 12, at 587 ("While the research body on the effects of
plain packaging is small and necessarily experimental, industry candor in internal
documents and trade literature shows that tobacco product packaging is seen to be a
persuasive form of advertising."). But see Petarganev, supra note 226 ("[A] critical
review of such studies that had found a potentially effective impact of plain packaging
on smoking ... has exposed major flaws - their results are ambiguous at best.").
328 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
329 See Petarganev, supra note 226.
330 See supra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
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make illicit whites the only packs with branding.3 ' These illicit
whites are manufactured legally but are then transported and sold
illegally in their target markets.33 2 This would leave the
advantages of cigarette branding in the hands of illicit
manufacturers, who are not subjected to minimal, if any, standards
and risk exposing consumers to cigarettes even more dangerous
than their legal counterparts. Mitigating measures are possible to
deter or prevent consumers' flight to brands,333 but it remains
insufficiently certain how consumers will react to a post-plain
packaging marketing environment and whether their attitudes
toward illicit whites will change. Australia's bold plain packaging
regime may provide the conditions to explore these questions. For
now, however, the impact of plain packaging on both the illicit
and non-illicit market represents a significant, and perhaps
insufficiently explored, consequence of tobacco regulation.
The topic of plain packaging, and the broader issue of tobacco
control, leaves much to be explored. Further work could evaluate
bills winding their way through national governments in the EU
that would impose plain packaging rules and their compatibility
with EU law. Further court challenges to Australia's plain
packaging system and other pending systems offer a rich resource
for exploring the legality of the initiative under TRIPS or other
international investment laws. There are also vast questions
related to the viability of these regimes under constitutional,
national, and international trademark law that can be more fully
explored. A longer-term view of such regulation may review the
propriety of restrictive or plain packaging rules to less socially
desirable products such as alcohol and certain junk foods.334 The
desirability of such regulation, which represents a different set of
331 See supra Part III.C.
332 See supra Part III.C.
333 See supra Part III.C.
334 E.g., Peter Tynan, Executive Health: The Plain Truth about Packaging, NEW
ZEALAND MGMT., Sept. 2012, at 54 ("Imagine a time in the not too distant future.
Chocolate bars are sold in uniform plain packaging, stored behind a grey screen and
available only upon request by those aged over 18."); Thomaselli, supra note 316
("Australia's high court last week upheld the Plain Packaging Act, making it the first
country to ban brand logos on all tobacco packages. That has led some to speculate
whether the ruling could set a global marketing precedent for everything from cigarettes
to sugary drinks to alcohol.").
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challenges and public policy implications than cigarettes, is ripe
for further discussion.
Tobacco consumption is a major health problem for most
governmental entities, including the EU. 3  With tobacco
consumption shown to cause millions of deaths and billions of
dollars in healthcare costs, 33 6 regulatory bodies have sought to
dramatically restrict the availability, promotions, and marketing of
tobacco products.33 7 Plain packaging will likely both impede
tobacco consumption and reduce desirability of smoking among
potential consumers. 3 8 The impact of plain packaging on illicit
and non-illicit cigarette markets and consumer behavior, however,
may be the ultimate test of whether plain packaging represents a
substantial success or one that is impeded by unexpected
consequences.
335 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
338 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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